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PREFACE 
Risks  have emerged a s  an  impor tan t  c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  eva lu -  
a t i o n  and s e l e c t i o n  o f  energy  s t r a t e g i e s .  The work of t h e  J o i n t  
IAEA/IIASA Research P r o j e c t  (IAEA: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy 
Agency) i s  o r i e n t e d  toward p rov id ing  i n fo rma t ion  on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
r i s k s ,  and t h e i r  s o c i a l  a s p e c t s ,  f o r  use  i n  d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  management o f  r i s k s .  The emphasis of  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i s  upon 
energy  systems.  
T h i s  r e s e a r c h  memorandum p r e s e n t s  r e s u l t s  o f  a  su rvey  under- 
t a k e n  t o  p r e d i c t  v o t i n g  behav iour ,  i n  a referendum on n u c l e a r  
energy ,  based upon t h e  u n d e r ly ing  b e l i e f s  abou t  t h e  consequences 
o f  a  p r o  o r  con v o t e  and t h e  v o t e r s '  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  how t h o s e  
o t h e r s  i m po r t an t  t o  him would wish him t o  v o t e .  The method i s  
an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h a t  used i n  two e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s ,  r e p o r t e d  i n  
RM-76-80 and RM-77-54. 

ABSTRACT 
This report describes an ap~lication of Fishbein's model 
ofintelltion formation to a study of voting choice in a nuclear 
energy ballot in the USA. The sample was randomly selected 
from the general public (N = 89). The model successfully 
predicted voting intention (multiple regression co- 
efficient = - 9 2 )  using two major variables: attitudes to the 
act of voting CON and subjective norms, i.e. the voters' 
perceptions of how the people or groups important to them 
(referents) would want them to vote. Both of these components 
contributed significantly to voting choice although the 
attitude was the primary determinant. The attitudes to the 
act of voting and the subjective norms were, in turn, well 
predicted from underlying beliefs, thus allowing identification 
of the specific issues which differentiated between those 
intending to vote PRO and CON nuclear energy. 
In general both groups of voters agreed on their evaluations 
of the possible consequences of the ballot. Further, they were 
both well informed about the basic issues and notential legal 
consequences of the proposal. What ultimately appears to have 
influenced the direction of their vote was their disagreement 
(i.e. their contrary beliefs) about the likely effects of the 
proposal on three major issues: the economy, the energy crisis 
and imnrovements in nuclear safety. The positions taken on 
these issues clearly differentiated those intending to vote 
PRO and CON. It should be noted, however, that the other issues 
about which there was considerable debate, e.9. the question of 
the constitutional status of the proposal, did not significantly 
differentiate the two groups of voters. 

INTRODUCTION 
Decision makers faced with the assessment of new or 
rapidly developing technologies are increasingly aware of the 
need to take into consideration a wide range of social 
variables. For instance, public attitudes, which until 
relatively recently were tacitly assumed to be in favour of 
technological advance, are now in question. This is partic- 
ularly true for decisions relating to nuclear power. In many 
countries the verbal and behavioural expression of preferences 
by pressure groups has already affected develop~ent programmes. 
If ~echnological assessment is to be sensitive to social issues 
then the decision makers require tools to measure the 
preferences of the public in general and those sub-groups to 
whom the issues may be of particular relevance. And further, 
if these publics are to participate to any degree in the 
eventual decision, then such a dialogue requires, on both sides, 
an understanding of the beliefs and values which determine the 
preferences of the various interest groups. 
The general public has become quite vocal in expressing its 
concerns particularly as energy decisions impact upon the price 
of energy, the safety and environmental consequences of the 
power production methods proposed, and the requirements for a 
change in lifestyle. Politicians are finding that acceptance by 
the public of an energy proposal is quite vital to its success; 
this has been especially true in the case of. nuclear power. 
More specifically, in 1976 a number of states in the USA 
scheduled voter referendums concerning restrictions upon the 
operation and construction of nuclear power plants. One of 
these, California's Proposition 15, if passed, would have made 
the construction of new plants and the operation of present ones 
contingent upon the removal of utility liability limits and the 
legislative approval of safety and waste disposal systems. Such 
propositions could lead to a halt in the development of nuclear 
power in the concerned states and consequently to a possible 
energy shortage. Despite the fact that last year's measures 
were defeated, it is quite likely that more voter referendums 
on nuclear power will be held in the future, for instance such 
a referendum is planned in Switzerland for late 1978. 
The concept of a referendum implies that voting behaviour 
is an indicator of preference and to some extent attitude toward 
the issue in question." Two recent reports (Otway and Fishbein, 
1976;1977) have used an expectancy-value model to predict 
attitude and to describe the beliefs which differentiate those 
in favour and those against the use of nuclear energy. A 
different model (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) also incorporating 
an expectancy-value formulation can be used to predict inten- 
tions to perform a specific behaviour such as voting choice, 
and to examine the underlying cognitions. This version of the 
model has already been applied to voting intentions and voting 
behaviour in the USA and the UK (Fishbein and Coombs, 1974; 
Fishbein, Thomas and Jaccard, 1976). In this report we 
describe the use of the extended attitude model to study voting 
on the Oregon Nuclear Safeguards Initiative (Ballot Issue No. 9) 
during the 1976 General Electionin Oregon, USA. In this referendum 
the voter was required to vote in favour ("yes") or against 
("no") the placing of restrictions on future nuclear Power 
plants. In order to avoid confusion with the intuitive expec- 
tation that "yes" corresponds to a vote in favour of nuclear 
energy, throuqhout this report those who voted (or intended to 
vote) in favour of restrictions on the nuclear power plants 
will be referred to as being CON nuclear power, and those who 
voted (or intended to vote) against restrictions will be termed 
PRO nuclear power. 
THE INTENTION PREDICTION MODEL 
Fishbein's model for the prediction of behavioural intention 
is based on three major points. First, although the performance 
of overt behaviour is subject to the vagaries of unexpected and 
unpredictable contingencies, a basic proposition of the appr~ach 
is that most human behaviour is under volitional control, and 
thus it is assumed that the primary determinant of a given 
behavioural act is the person's intention to perform that act. 
More importantly, an intention to perform a given behaviour is 
viewed as a function of measurable attitude and belief variables. 
Second, the attitudinal contribution to an intention is a 
function of the expected consequences of the overt behaviour, 
where each consequence is weighted by its value. Thus the 
attitude in question is toward the behaviour (Aact) rather than 
some object (or person) toward which the behaviour is 
* The relation between attitude toward an issue and general 
behaviour in response to that issue raises problems which are 
beyond the scope of this report (see Thomas, 1971; Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975). 
d i r e c t e d . *  Th i rd ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between a  p e r s o n ' s  a t t i t u d e  
toward a  behaviour  and h i s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  perform t h a t  behav iour  
i s  s u b j e c t  t o  m o d i f i c a t i o n  by h i s  p e r c e p t i o n s  of how people  o r  
groups  impor tan t  t o  him ( h i s  r e l e v a n t  r e f e r e n t s )  want him t o  
behave. Th i s  i s  know a s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  norm (SN).  These 
p o i n t s  a r e  summarized i n  F igure  1 and a r e  expressed  more 
f o r m a l l y  t h u s  : 
where B i s  t h e  behav iour  i n  q u e s t i o n ;  BI i s  t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  
i n t e n t i o n ;  A a c t  i s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  toward performing t h e  a c t  o r  
behaviour ;  S N  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  norm, a  summary of  b e l i e f s  
abou t  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n s  of r e l e v a n t  r e f e r e n t s ;  and w and w2 a r e  1' 
weigh t ing  pa ramete r s  which r e f l e c t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  impor tance  o f  
A a c t  and SN. These w e i g h t s  a r e  expec ted  t o  v a r y  a c r o s s  
i n d i v i d u a l s  and a c r o s s  behav iours .  I n  p r a c t i c e  t h e  v a l u e s  of 
t h e  we igh t s  f o r  any g i v e n  behav iour  a r e  d e r i v e d  f o r  t h e e n t i r e  
sample o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  by m u l t i p l e  r e g r e s s i o n :  
I n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  model t h e  behav iour  i n  
q u e s t i o n  was ' v o t i n g  i n  f avour  of r e s t r i c t i o n s  on n u c l e a r  power 
p l a n t s '  ( t h e  CON p o s i t i o n )  i n  t h e  Oregon referendum. The 
b e h a v i o u r a l  i n t e n t i o n  was t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s '  i n t e n t i o n ,  s t a t e d  i n  
advance,  t o  v o t e  i n  f avour  of r e s t r i c t i o n s  (CON) i n  t h e  b a l l o t .  
The a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  a c t  o f  v o t i n g ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
a t t i t u d i n a l  component of t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  i n t e n t i o n  t o  v o t e  
can be expressed  i n  t e r m s  of  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  b e l i e f s  t h u s :  
where Aact i s  t h e  a t t i t u d e  toward performing t h e  behav iour  o r  
a c t i o n  ( h e r e  c a s t i n g  t h e  CON v o t e ) ,  bi i s  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  
- 
* The r e l a t i o n  between A and c o n s t i t u e n t  b e l i e f s  i s  d i r e c t l y  a c t  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  used i n  e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s  t o  
d e s c r i b e  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between a t t i t u d e  toward an o b j e c t  and t h e  
a t t r i b u t e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h a t  o b j e c t :  
b e l i e f  t h a t  performing t h e  behaviour  ( c a s t i n g  t h e  CON v o t e )  
w i l l  l e a d  t o  consequence i; e i s  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  conse- i 
quence i; and n i s  t h e  number o f  s a l i e n t  b e l i e f s  abou t  per-  
forming t h e  behaviour  ( t h e  s a l i e n t  consequences o f  c a s t i n g  t h e  
CON v o t e ) .  
The normative component o f  t h e  model (SN) i s  cons t rued  a s  
an  o v e r a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  what most impor tan t  r e f e r e n t s  
would advocate .  Th i s  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  i s ,  i n  t u r n ,  based on t h e  
p e r s o n ' s  p e r c e p t i o n s  of  what s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n t s  would b e l i e v e  
t o  be t h e  ' r i g h t / c o r r e c t  o r  b e s t '  cou r se  of  a c t i o n  t o  t a k e ,  
and h i s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a ccep t  t h e  adv i ce ,  v iewpoint  o r  p r e s s u r e  
-
of  t h e s e  r e f e r e n t s .  Thus: 
where Nb, i s  t h e  normat ive  b e l i e f  abou t  r e f e r e n t  j ( he r e  t h e  
J 
r e s p o n d en t ' s  b e l i e f  t h a t  r e f e r e n t  j t h i n k s  he/she shou ld  cast 
t h e  CON v o t e  on t h e  b a l l o t ) ;  M c i  i s  t h e  r e sponden t ' s  w i l l i n g -  
J 
n e s s  t o  a c c e p t  o r  comply w i t h  t h e  normat ive  p r e s c r i p t i o n  o f  
r e f e r e n t  j; and m i s  t h e  number of r e l e v a n t  r e f e r e n t s  (rele- 
v a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c a s t i n g  a vo t e  on t h e  Nuclear  Safeguards  
I n i t i a t i v e  i s s u e ) .  
The model summarised i n  t h e  formal  s t a t e m e n t s  (1) through 
( 4 )  n o t  o n l y  p r e d i c t s  v o t i n g  i n t e n t i o n  and behav iour ,  b u t  
p r o v i d e s  a  framework f o r  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  and a n a l y s i s  o f  b e l i e f  
and v a l u e  d a t a  which can  c o n t r i b u t e  a  g r e a t  d e a l  t o  t h e  
unders tand ing  o f  t h e  u n de r ly ing  r ea sons  f o r  v o t i n g  cho ice .  
The i n t e n t i o n  t o  v o t e  i n  a  g iven  d i r e c t i o n ,  o r  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
i s s u e ,  may be determined by e i t h e r  a t t i t u d i n a l  o r  normat ive  
f a c t o r s ,  o r  by bo th ;  and t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  c a n  be 
a s s e s s e d  from t h e  s i z e  and s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  
r e g r e s s i o n  we igh t s  d e r i v e d  from s t a t emen t  ( 2 ) .  The a t t i t u d i n a l  
component c an  be f u r t h e r  exp lo r ed  by examining t h e  s t r e n g t h s  
o f  s a l i e n t  b e l i e f s  abou t  t h e  expected  consequences o f  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  v o t e ,  and t h e  v a l u e s  p laced  on  t h e s e  outcomes. I n  
a n  analogous  way, u s i n g  s t a t emen t  ( 4 ) ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  normat ive  
t e r m  (SN) can  be ex p l o r ed  f u r t h e r  by comparing t h e  s t r e n g t h s  
of  pe rce ived  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  r e l e v a n t  o t h e r s  ( t h e  normat ive  
b e l i e f s )  and m o t i v a t i o n s  t o  comply w i th  t h e s e  r e l e v a n t  r e f e r e n t s .  
I t  shou ld  be  no ted  t h a t  t h e  model i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  concerned 
w i t h  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  b e hav iou ra l  i n t e n t i o n ,  as opposed t o  
behaviour .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  i s ,  t h a t  w h i l e  peop le  g e n e r a l l y  do 
what t hey  say  t h ey  w i l l  do,  a  wide range of  unforeseen  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s  may, i n  t h e o r y ,  i n t e r v e n e  between t h e  s t a t emen t  
of  i n t e n t i o n  and t h e  performance of  t h e  behaviour .  The s h o r t e r  
t h e  t i m e  i n t e r v a l  between t h e  measurement of  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  and 
t h e  o v e r t  a c t ,  t h e  more a c c u r a t e  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  behaviour  
w i l l  be. Thus, f o r  example, i f  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t udy ,  i n  t h e  
i n t e r v a l  between t h e  measurement o f  b e l i e f s ,  a t t i t u d e s  and  
v o t i n g  i n t e n t i o n  and t h e  a c t u a l  b a l l o t ,  a  major  n u c l e a r  power 
a c c i d e n t  had o c c u r r e d ,  o r  a  renewed campaign had  been mounted 
by e i t h e r  s i d e  i n  t h e  N u c l e a r  S a f e g u a r d s  I n i t i a t i v e ,  t h e n  it 
i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  b e l i e f s  and a t t i t u d e s  and hence  v o t i n g  
i n t e n t i o n s  may have  been  changed.  I n  s u c h  a  c a s e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
measures  c o u l d  n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e v e n t u a l  v o t i n g  
b e h a v i o u r  w i t h  t h e  same a c c u r a c y .  
METHOD 
E l i c i t a t i o n  o f  S a l i e n t  B e l i e f s  and Re levan t  R e f e r e n t s  .- 
I n  t h e o r y ,  t h e  model r e q u i r e s  t h a t  o n l y  s a l i e n t  b e l i e f s  
a b o u t  t h e  consequences  o f  b e h a v i o u r ,  and o n l y  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  r e l e v a n t  r e f e r e n t s  a r e  used .  Both ' s a l i e n t '  
and ' r e l e v a n t ' ,  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  model ,  a r e  o p e r a t i o n a l l y  
d e f i n e d  a s  t h o s e  b e l i e f s  o r  r e f e r e n t s  which a r e  q u i c k l y  and 
e a s i l y  e l i c i t e d  by s u b j e c t s  i n  a  free r e s p o n s e  s i t u a t i o n .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  however,  when t h e  i s s u e  ( t h e  b e h a v i o a r  o r  
a t t i t u d e  o b j e c t )  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  o f  any complex i ty  it i s  assumed 
t h a t  r e s p o n d e n t s  w i l l  have  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a r t i c u l a t i n g  t h e i r  
b e l i e f s  and t h e i r  r e s p o n s e s  a r e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  supplemented  by 
b e l i e f  i t e m s  from c o n t e n t  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e ,  
from campaign media and ,  f o r  v o t i n g  b e h a v i o u r ,  f rom e l e c t i o n  
campaign m a t e r i a l s .  
I n  t h i s  s t u d y  o f  t h e  Oregon B a l l ~ t ~ e l i c i t a t i o n  i t e r v i e w s  
w e r e  conduc ted  by t e l e p h o n e  w i t h  19 p o t e n t i a l  v o t e r s ,  randomly 
s e l e c t e d  from t e l e p h o n e  d i r e c t o r i e s .  The r e s u l t s  of  t h e s e  
i n t e r v i e w s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  supplementary  s o u r c e s ,  p r o v i d e d  a  
l i s t  o f  20 outcome b e l i e f s  ( consequences  of  v o t i n g  CON) and 
7  r e f e r e n t s  r e l e v a n t  t o  o p i n i o n s  on t h e  N u c l e a r  S a f e g u a r d s  
I n i t i a t i v e .  These  b e l i e f s  a r e  l i s t e d  a s  p a r t  o f  T a b l e s  2  , 3 and 
4  and t h e  r e f e r e n t s  a s  p a r t  o f  T a b l e  5 .  
The Sample 
F i n a n c i a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  p r e v e n t e d  f a c e - t o - f a c e  i n t e r v i e w s  
and  r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  s i z e  and n a t u r e  o f  t h e  sample  used .  Approx- 
i m a t e l y  one  t o  two weeks b e f o r e  t h e  November 1976 e l e c t i o n ,  
q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  w e r e  m a i l e d  t o  500 a d d r e s s e s  randomly s e l e c t e d  
from t h e  c u r r e n t  t e l e p h o n e  d i r e c t o r y  f o r  P o r t l a n d ,  Oregon. Of 
t h e  500 q u e s t i o n n a i r e s ,  47 w e r e  r e t u r n e d  by t h e  P o s t  O f f i c e  as 
' u n d e l i v e r a b l e '  and 89 u s e a b l e  r e p l i e s  w e r e  r e c e i v e d * .  
*When viewed w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  comparable  m a i l  s u r v e y s  t h i s  
r e s p o n s e  ra te  o f  1 8 % ,  i n  t h e  absence  o f  a n  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  
r e s p o n d i n g ,  i s  n o t  a t y p i c a l ,  a l t h o u g h  it i s  s l i g h t l y  lower  
t h a n  a v e r a g e .  F o r  example,  i n  s even  s t u d i e s  o b s e r v e d  r e t u r n  
rates f o r  n o - i n c e n t i v e  g roups  r anged  from 10% t o  40% (Kanuk 
and  Berenson ,  1975)  . 
These respondents tended to be somewhat older (mean age = 51.9) 
and better educated (mean educational level = some college or 
business school) than the general population. Subsequent 
voting data showed that this sample was almost equally divided 
between those who voted PRO and CON. Thus, although non- 
representative of the general population (where the majority of 
Oregon voters (58%) opposed the referendum, i.e. supported the 
PRO position), almost equal numbers of PRO and CON voters are 
optimal for exploring the decision process and uncovering 
relationships between voting behaviour and other variables. 
Clearly the sample was not ideal; however, it was adequate to 
demonstrate the uti,lity of the model in this substantive area 
of application. 
The Questionnaire 
Measures of the model's theoretical constructs were obtained 
in a closed-format questionnaire. Briefly, attitudinal variables 
(Aact and e) were measured on semantic differential scales 
assessing 'goodness-badness' on a 7-point scale (+3 to -3). 
All belief strengths were measured on similar scales which 
referred to the likelihood that the belief item in question (or 
more precisely the associative relation expressed by the belief 
statement) was 'true'. The order of presentation of items in 
the questionnaire was as follows: attitude toward the act of 
voting CON, (Aact ) ;  evaluation (attitudes) toward 20 consequences 
of the CON vote (el; belief strength for each consequence (b); 
belief strength of the general subjective norm (SN); strength of 
normative belief (Nb) ; motivation to comply (Flc) ; and behavioural 
intention to vote CON.* Table 1 shows the format of each of 
these types of question.** 
Follow-UD Interview 
A follow-up telephone interview conducted shortly (2 to 4 
days) after the election asked three questions about actual 
voting behaviour: "Did you vote in the November General 
Election?", "Did you vote on the Oregon Nuclear Safeguards 
Initiative-Ballot Measure No. 9?", and "How did you vote on the 
* Note that intentions are expressed as beliefs in one's own 
intended actian; therefore, intention varies on a belief 
strength dimension. 
* *  Several other measures external to the model were also 
obtained. These will be discussed in a paper presently in 
preparation for publication. 
Nuclear Safeguards Initiative?". 
RESULTS 
The overall aim of this study of voting in a nuclear energy 
referendum is to understand voting choice in terms of beliefs, 
values, and important reference groups.; but the validity of 
such descriptive findings depends on the performance of the 
model as a whole. The predictive accuracy of the model will 
therefore be reported first. 
Prediction of Voting Intention and Voting Behaviour 
As expected, voting intention was strongly related to 
voting behaviour (r = .89, p < .001). In turn, voting intention 
was accurately predicted from attitude toward the act of voting 
(Aact ) and the general subjective norm (SN). The multiple 
regression coefficient was -92 (p < .001). Thus, together, the 
attitudinal and normative components account for 84.6% of the 
variance in voting intention. Moreover, although both 
components have -statistically significant standardised 
regression coefficients, Aact accounts for considerably more 
variance than does the general norm (for Aact, B = .80, p < .01; 
for SN, B = .17, p < .01). 
The Estimates of Aact and SN from Underlying Beliefs 
The salient beliefs within the population about consequences 
of voting in the Nuclear Safeguards Initiative Ballot, supple- 
mented by beliefs taken from the media and campaign literature, 
were used to estimate the global components of the model, Aact 
and SN from equations (3) and (4) respectively. The correlation 
n 
between biei and Aact was .74 (df = 80, p < .01); 
1 
and C Nb. Mc and SN was .79 (df = 80, p < .01). Given these { J J  
high correlations the belief-based estimates may be used in 
place of Aact and SN in the prediction of voting intention. 
When this is done, the multiple regression coefficient R is 
still highly significant (R = .86, p < .001). As with the 
global measures the estimates of both Aact and of SN received 
significant weights in the regression equation and again it was 
the attitudinal component which accounted for the greater part 
of the variance in voting intention. 
The Cognitive Basis of Voting Choice 
The predictions of A act and SN from beliefs 
provide some evidence that we have identified those cognitive 
elements that underlie our respondents' intentions to vote, or 
not to vote, CON on the referendum issue. Together with the 
earlier validation of the model of intention formation at its 
global level, our findings can be taken as support for the 
following explanation of voting behaviour: 
(1) People form beliefs about the consequences of voting 
for or against the referendum issue in question 
from information obtained from the media and from 
their social interactions with others. People also 
form beliefs about the advocation or wishes of 
relevant others, with respect to the referendum. 
(2) On the basis of these beliefs they form positive or 
negative attitudes toward voting (PRO or) CON; and 
they also form a subjective norm with respect to 
voting in a given direction, i.e., a summary position 
of their beliefs about whether most others, important 
to them, think they should vote (PRO or) CON. 
( 3 )  Although both the attitude and the subjective norm 
contribute to their intention to vote CON, this 
particular intention seems to be more strongly 
determined by attitudinal considerations (i.e. by 
beliefs about the consequences of voting CON) than 
by normative considerations (beliefs that others 
think they should vote CON). Thus, for example, 
the more a person believes that a CON vote will 
lead to outcomes he personally values and/or will 
prevent outcomes he views as 'bad', the more 
favourable he will be to voting CON and the greater 
the likelihood that he will intend to (and will 
actually) vote CON. It is important to note that in 
other elections and/or with different populations 
voting choice may not be primarily a function of 
attitudinal considerations. That is, for different 
issues or in different cultures normative factors may 
be equally or more important. 
( 4 )  Thus, to more fully understand the basis for a CON vote 
we must look both at the beliefs that underlie the 
attitudes and at those that underlie the subjective 
norms. 
Differences in Beliefs and Evaluations between PRO and CON 
Voters 
It is important to note that when making a comparison 
between groups in terms of their cognitive structures, there 
are several ways in which the beliefs may differ. For example, 
individuals or groups may differ in the direction and/or 
intensity of their evaluation of a set of attributes or con- 
sequences; they may also differ in the direction and strengths 
of their beliefs about those attributes or consequences. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the mean beliefs and evaluations for 
the PRO and CON voters. In this study we have distinguished 
between the two voting groups in terms of three categories of 
beliefs: those for which both groups of voters hold similar 
beliefs and - similar evaluations (Table 2); those where there is 
consensus about their likelihood of occurrence but on which the 
PRO and CON voters place different values (Table 3); and those 
where there is common evaluation across the voting group but 
where they disagree about the likelihood of the outcome 
following from the passage of the referendum proposal (Table 4). 
These three types of beliefs are discussed below. 
It should be clear that when voters hold similar beliefs 
and evaluations it cannot be these beliefs which account for 
differences in voting behaviour. Observed differences in 
attitudes toward voting for the CON position must reflect 
differences in voters' beliefs about the consequences of a 
successful CON vote and/or differences in their evaluations of 
those consequences. That is, if a person believes that casting 
a vote for the CON position will lead to good consequences and 
prevent bad ones, he should have a positive attitude toward 
voting CON; and, similarly, if a person believes that casting a 
vote for the CON position will lead to negatively valued outcomes 
and prevent positive ones, he should have a negative atttitude 
toward voting CON. 
It is important to realize, however, that a CON voter need 
not necessarily believe that a CON vote will only lead to 
'good' consequences or prevent 'bad' ones. The public is better 
informed than it is often given credit for and even CON voters 
would have been aware that passage of theproposal could lead to 
some negative outcomes; similarly, the PRO voters may have 
believed that a CON vote would lead to some advantages. Through 
information provided by media coverage and discussing the 
referendum proposal with family, friends and co-workers, the 
voting public learned about the essential issues of the 
referendum, and this is shown in our data. 
From Tables 2 and 3 it can be seen that the public was 
correctly informed (i.e. believed) that a CON vote would mean a 
change in Oregon's present system for regulating nuclear power; 
they were aware that the success of the proposal 
(the CON position) would require new tests of nuclear safety 
systems and a decision on a permanent nuclear waste disposal 
method. They knew that passage of the proposal would mean 
that regulatory control of nuclear power would be given to 
state legislators and they inferred that this would make it more 
difficult for companies to obtain legislative approval for new 
nuclear power plants. Further, they also knew that supporting 
the CON position would make nuclear power plant operators 
financially responsible for nuclear accidents and would 
essentially give full compensation to victims of a nuclear 
accident. Knowing the potential impact of such financial and 
legislative requirements on the industry, most voters inferred 
that if the referendum proposal were passed this would be 
equivalent to banning the construction of nuclear power plants. 
Finally, although not directly part of the referendum proposal, 
media coverage and general public debate had made it clear to 
most voters that the passage of the proposal would not ensure 
low-cost electricity and would probably lead to a court battle 
over the constitutional validity of the proposition. 
While the public agreed on the evaluation of the conse- 
quences shown in Table 2,this was not so clearly the case for 
outcomes shown in Table 3. In fact, of the 20 possible out- 
comes considered in the present study, the PRO and CON voters 
evaluated only the three outcomes listed in Table 3 in opposite 
directions; in only - one of these cases was the difference 
statistically significant. That is, as expected, the PRO group 
felt that a ban on more nuclear power plants would be a 'bad' 
thing while the CON group positively evaluated this outcome. 
Similarly (although not statistically significant), the PRO 
group positively evaluated Oregon's present system for regu- 
lating nuclear power, while the CON group felt that maintaining 
the present system would be 'bad'. Finally, although the 
difference is very slight, the PRO group tended to negatively 
value a court battle over the referendum's constitutionality, 
while the CON group was neutral to slightly in favour of such 
a confrontation. 
Of the 17 remaining outcomes (see Tables 2 and 4 1 ,  10 were 
viewed as 'good' by both groups of voters (e.g. setting up 
realistic standards for nuclear waste management systems, 
decreasing the danger from radioactive materials and wastes, 
making new plants safer than present ones, ensuring low-cost 
electricity, making nuclear power plant operators fully re- 
sponsible financially for nuclear accidents);and 7 were con- 
sensually evaluated as 'bad' (e.g. denying full compensation 
to the victims of a nuclear accident, giving regulatory control 
of nuclear power to state legislatures, reducing funds for 
development of alternative energy sources, eliminating a needed 
energy source, increasing unemployment). 
Thus far we have outlined areas of belief where the PRO 
and CON voters agreed and where this consensus realistically 
reflects the issues at stake. Further, given the similarity 
in the respondents' evaluations of the beliefs shown in 
Table 2, these beliefs cannot account for differences in voting 
behaviour. In contrast, the beliefs shown in Table 3 do start 
to provide some insights into differential voting behaviour. 
Clearly those who negatively evaluated the current regulatory 
system in Oregon and who favoured the banning of new nuclear 
power plants would have stronger 'CON' attitudes than those 
who held the opposite views. 
But, perhaps even more important than these differences in 
evaluations, there was considerable public disagreement in 
beliefs about the consequences of casting a CON vote. It ap- 
pears that these belief differences were -the major factors which 
distinguished those intending to vote PRO from those intending 
to vote CON. Table 4 shows that there was considerable dis- 
agreement about the effects of a CON vote. These disagreements 
are related to 3 basic issues: (1) the state's economy; (2) the 
energy crisis; and (3) the safety of nuclear power plants. 
Some people believed that adoption of the CON position would 
harm economic development in Oregon and increase unemployment, 
while others were uncertain about its effects on economic 
development and believed it would not increase unemployment. 
Not surprisingly those in ,the first group were much more likely 
to vote PRO while those in the second group were more likely to 
vote CON. 
There was also considerable disagreement about the effects 
of the referendum on the energy crisis in general. There were 
some who believed that passage of the proposal (the CON position) 
would reduce funds for development of alternative energy 
sources, would eliminate a needed energy source, and would 
ultimately lead to a future energy shortage. Others felt that 
these outcomes were uplikely. As expected, those in the former 
group were much more likely to vote PRO while those in the 
latter group were much more likely to vote CON. 
The final area of disagreement concerned the likelihood that 
success of the referendum proposal (the CON position) would make 
new nuclear plants safer than present ones, set up realistic 
standards for nuclear waste management, decrease danger from 
radioactive materials and wastes and reduce the threat of 
nuclear sabotage. It is interesting to note that it is in this 
area that some of the strongest differences in beliefs were 
found. In general, if a person believed that passage of the 
proposition (the CON position) would accomplish these goals, 
he or she was very likely to vote CON. On the other hand, if 
the person felt that risk reductions were unlikely outcomes of 
supporting the CON position, they were very likely to vote PRO. 
What the analysis of the underlying cognitive structure of 
attitude toward voting choice clearly indicates is that the 
central questions that seemed to decide the vote were those 
concerning safety (or avoidance of risk), economic benefits, 
and long-range implications for the energy crisis. In general, 
voters who believed that a CON vote would reduce nuclear hazard 
and increase safety without harming the economy or i,ncreasing 
the probability of an energy crisis supported the referendum 
proposal (i.e. voted CON). On the other hand those who 
believed that a CON vote whould harm the economy and increase 
the likelihood of a future energy shortage without reducing 
nuclear risk or increasing safety, voted against the proposal 
(i .e. voted PRO) . 
Normative Beliefs and Votins Choice 
It was shown above that in the present study attitudinal 
considerations were the primary determinants of voting inten- 
tions and behaviour. Though not as important, the subjective 
norm did contribute significantly to 4he prediction. Therefore, 
it is worthwhile to examine the determinants of the subjective 
norm in some detail. Moreover, it should be emphasised that 
for other populations and/or other issues subjective norms 
could be equal or more important than attitudes. In a manner 
similar to the previous attitudinal analysis the determinants 
of the subjective norm (the normative beliefs and motivation 
to comply with particular referents) were examined separately 
for the two voting groups. The mean values for the belief 
strengths (i.e. the strength of the perceived expectation that 
each referent would advocate a CON vote) and the mean level of 
motivation to comply with each of these referents are shown in 
Table 5. There are significant differences in the voters' 
perceptions of personal referents (family, friends and co- 
workers), each group believing that their own PRO/CON position 
is supported by these referents and each group equally moti- 
vated to comply with their expectations. 
For the four public reference groups associated with the 
ballot issue, the voting groups agreed in all cases on the 
direction of the perceived advocation. Both PRO and CON voters 
believed that 'the power companies', 'most government officials' 
and 'most nuclear experts' would expect them to vote PRO, while 
'the environmentalists' would think that they should vote CON. 
There was, however, a significant difference between the voters 
in the strength of the perceived advocation of the 'nuclear 
experts'. Those intending to vote PRO believed their position 
was strongly supported by the nuclear experts, whereas the CON 
voters (as a group) were barely convinced that the nuclear 
experts would advocate the PRO position, that is, would advocate 
a vote against restrictions on nuclear power plants. This 
finding suggests that voters accurately perceive the divided 
opinions among nuclear scientists. 
pqotivation to comply with the public referents was 
significantly different across the two voting groups for all 
referents except the environmentalists; and, again with this 
one exception, it was the PRO voters who had the greatest 
motivation to comply. The CON group were more motivated to 
comply with the environmentalists although this was not a 
statistically significant difference. Further, it appears that 
there was some ambivalence among the PRO voters with regard to 
the advocation of the environmentalists. Consistent with this, 
previous studies have shown that those PRO nuclear energy take 
this standpoint despite significant concern about the hazards 
associated with nuclear waste. The finding here that the PRO 
voters clearly perceive the normative pressure from the 
environmentalist lobby in the direction contrary to their own 
position, and nevertheless express some level of motivation to 
comply with this expectation may be interpreted as an indication 
of their conflict with regard to environmental issues. 
The differences between referents in their power to evoke 
compliance from the respondents, irrespective of voting inten- 
tion, are also interesting. For the overall sample a comparison 
of the mean levels of compliance with the different referents 
were, in order of increasing compliance: (a) 2.54 - power 
companies; (b) 2.75 - co-workers; (c) 2.82 - most government 
officials; (d) 2.89 - close friends; (e) 3.39 - most members of 
my family; (f) 3.93 - environmentalists; and (g) 4.31 - most 
nuclear experts. This ordering is similar to that obtained by 
Harris (1975). For the public at large, scientists were rated 
the highest in inspiring 'a great deal' of confidence on matters 
relating to nuclear energy development. And, as in the present 
study, power companies elicited lower confidence rating than 
various government regulatory agencies. Confidence ratings for 
environmentalists were below scientists and above government 
agencies for the public at large, also consistent with the 
findings here. It seems that the general public is heavily 
influenced by the positions taken by scientists and nuclear 
experts, although environmentalist groups also effect voter 
decision-making. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study has demonstrated the predictive power of 
the Fishbein model when applied to voter decision-making in the 
nuclear energy area. The major predictions of the model were 
confirmed and it was shown to account for most of the variance 
in voting intention and voting behaviour. The two major com- 
ponents of voting intention, attitude toward the act (Aact) 
and the general subjective norm (SN) were well estimated by 
n m 
their subcomponents, 1 S e and C Nb.Mc respectively. In i i i j I j 
this scc2y >:.he attitudinal components of the model contributed 
considerably more to the prediction of voting intention and 
behaviour than did the subjective norm. 
Detazled analysis of the cognitive structures underlying 
the alkltudes oE  the two voting groups revealed important 
difzerences and similarities between those intending to vote 
PRO and CON riuclear energy. In general both groups of voters 
agreed on the values they placed on the possible consequences 
of the ballot, with the one obvious exception that the CON 
voters weze considerably more in favour of the outcome 'a ban 
on more nuclear power plants'. Both groups of voters were well 
informed about the basic issues involved in the proposal, and 
the legal consequences of its passage (e.g. giving decision 
making power to state legislators and making plant operators 
financially responsible) . 
What ultimately appears to have influenced the direction 
of voting was disagreement (i.e. contrary beliefs) about the 
potential effects of the success of the proposal on three major 
issues: the economy, the energy crisis and improvements in 
nuclear safety. The positions taken on these issues clearly 
distinguished between the two groups of voters. It should be 
noted, however, that these were not the only issues which 
entered the public debate. The question of the constitutional 
status of the proposal was the subject of considerable 
discussion but did not, in the event, significantly differen- 
tiate -those intending to vote PRO and CON. 
Examination of normative beliefs and motivation to comply 
with referents perceived as relevant to nuclear energy issues 
also revealed some important similarities and differences 
between the two groups: PRO and CON voters each perceived those 
close tc them as advocating a stand consistent with their own. 
In general they were also in agreement on the public stands taken 
taken by reference groups in positions of authority. 
Appiication of the Fishbein model to the prediction of 
voting ehoice oil a nuclear energy issue has provided consider- 
able information on the cognitive structures of those intending 
to vote PRO or CON; and the findings are consistent with 
earlier studies. Clearly the scope of this preliminary study 
was geographically limited and the sample small, but the quality 
of the data suggest that the approach could usefully be applied 
on a larg-er scale to the exploration of beliefs and values 
underlying voting behaviour on energy issues and to the choice 
and importance of expert and normative referents. The model 
identified the real issues which distinguished between those 
intending to vote PRO and those intending to vote CON nuclear 
energy: a significant step forward for the understanding of 
voting choice. 
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Figure 1 Schematic Representation of Conceptual Framework for the 
Prediction of Specific Intentions and Behaviours 
BELIEFS ABOUT 
PERFORMING 
BEHAVIOUR X 
) 
ATTITUDE TOWARD 
PERFORMING 
1 
I 
I 
BEHAVIOUR X I I 
I 
INTENTION TO 
PERFORM 
BEHAVIOUR X 
1 
NORMATIVE 
-b 
SUBJECTIVE NORM 
BELIEFS ABOUT 
PERFORMING 
BEHAVIOUR X 
BEHAVIOUR X 
I 
I 
4 I I 
I I 
L --------,--------------------------- J 
' ABOUT 
I 
I 
PERFORMING I 
BEHAVIOUR X I 
TABLE I EXAMPLES O F  QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
1. B e h a v i o u r a l  or  voting i n t e n t i o n  ( B I )  
I INTEND TO VOTE "YES" ON THE OREGON NUCLEAR 
SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E ,  BALLOT MEASURE NO. 9.  
l i k e l y  
-- 
u n l i k e l y  
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
2 .  A t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  t he  act  of voting " Y e s " ,  (CON posit ion,  A  ) 
act 
VOTING "YES" ON THE OREGON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS 
I N I T I A T I V E ,  BALLOT MEASURE NO. 9. 
good bad 
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
w i s e  fool ish  
--- 
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
h a r m f u l  beneficial  
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
3 .  E v a l u a t i o n s  of the  consequences ( e i )  
MAKING NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS SAFER THAN PRESENT ONES 
good bad 
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
4. B e l i e f  about the act ( b i )  
VOTING "YES" ON THE ORE'GON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E ,  BALLOT MEASURE 
NO. 9,  PJOULD MAKE NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS SAFER THAN PRESENT ONES. 
l i k e l y  
--- 
un l ike ly  
--- 
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
5. Subjective n o r m  (SN)  
MOST PEOPLE WHO ARE IMPORTANT TO ME THINK I SHOULD VOTE "YES" ON THE 
OREGON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E ,  BALLOT MEASURE NO. 9. 
l i k e l y  u n l i k e l y  
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
6. ~orma t ive  belief (Nbi)  
MOST MEMBERS OF MY FAMILY THINK I SHOULD VOTE "YES" ON THE OREGON NUCLEAR 
SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E ,  BALLOT MEASUW> NO. 3. 
l i k e l y  u n l i k e l y  
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
7. M o t i v a t i o n  t o  c o m p l y  (Mc . ) 
1 
GENERALLY SPEAKING, WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR POWER REGU- 
LATION, I WANT TO DO WHAT MOST MEMBERS OF MY FAMILY THINK I SHOULD DO. 
l i k e l y  u n l i k e l y  
e x t r e m e l y  q u i t e  s l i g h t l y  n e i t h e r  s l i g h t l y  q u i t e  e x t r e m e l y  
Table 2 Consequences of the CON Vote on which Voters 
Agreed on Both Beliefs and Evaluations 
PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF VOTING 
AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER ON THE ORE- AVERAGE B E L I E F  STRENGTH AVERAGE EVALUATION 
GON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E  
MAKE I T  EASY FOR COMPANIES TO O B T A I N  
Table 3 Consequences of the CON Vote where Voters Agreed on 
Beliefs but had Different Evaluations 
AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER ON THE OfiE- AVERAGE S E L I  EF .STRENGTH AVERAGE EVALUATION 
GON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E  
A BAN ON MORE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
* DIFFERENCE S I G N I F I C A N T  AT THE 0 , m  LEVEL OR BEYOND 1-1 GROUP VOTING PRO =-GROUP . . , . . . , . . .. . , . VOTING CON 
Table 4 Consequences of the CON Vote on which Voters had Similar 
Evaluations but Disagreed on Beliefs 
PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF VOTING 
AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER ON THE ORE- AVERAGE B E L I E F  STRENGTH AVERAGE EVALUATION 
GON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS I N I T I A T I V E  
I 
P 
w 
I 
ELI 'MINATE A NEEDED ENERGY SOURCE 
RADIOACTIVE 
* DIFFERENCE S I G N I F I C A N T  AT 0 ~ 0 5 ~  LEVEL O R  BEYOND 1 GROUP. VOTING PRO 
Table 5 Mean Scores of Normative Beliefs and ~otivations to Comply 
for Those Intending to Vote PRO and CON Nuclear Energy. 
REFERENTS WHO MAY BE PERCEIVED AS 
ADVOCATING A V O T E  AGAINST NUCLEAR 
MOST MEMBERS OF MY FAMILY 
THE POWER COMPANIES 
" DIFFERENCE SIGNIFICANT- AT 0 . ~ 0 5 1  LEVEL OR BEYOND .,/-]GROUP VOTING PRO GROUP VOTI I\IG CON 
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